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I. INTRODUCTION
If Congress wants the American citizens to have access to adequate health
care, then Congress must accept its responsibility to define the scope of ERISA
preemption and to enact legislation that will ensure every patient has access to
that care.'

Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA7)2 to protect employee interests 3 and ensure a
uniform body of law for pension and benefit plans. 4 The statute's

expansive preemption clause 5 and preclusion of extra-contractual
damages 6 have since been used to immunize Managed Care
Organizations ("MCOs") from liability for patient s injuries resulting

from medical malpractice. Because plaintiffs with preempted claims
may receive only the remedies provided for under ERISA-the right
or benefit due under the plan9-many injured patients have been left
with no meaningful remedy.19
1.

Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616 n.7 (S.D.

Tex. 1998).
2.
3.

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).

4.

See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,45-46 (1987).

5.
See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) ("[ERISA] shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.. ...
6.
See ERISA § 502(aX1XB), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX(1B) (1994) (authorizing a participant or
beneficiary to bring an action "to recover benefits,... enforce his rights under the terms of the
plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan").
7.
The term Managed Care Organization ("MCO") will be used throughout this Note to
refer generally to Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), Preferred Provider
Organizations ("PPOs"), Point of Service plans ("POS"), Physician-Hospital Organizations
("PHOs"), and Independent Practice Associations ("IPAs7). For a discussion of MCO structures
and cost-containment methods, see infra Part 1I1.-. See also Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan
J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health CareIndustry, 47 BAYLOR L.
RaV. 285, 287-95 (1995) (detailing the characteristics, structure, and types of liMOs); Domenick
C. DiCicco, Jr., HMO Liability for the Medical Negligence of Member Physicians, 43 VILL. L.
REV. 499, 500-04 (1998) (describing the history of HMOs and the various HMO models); Vicki
Lawrence MacDougall, The "SharedRisk" of Potential Tort Liability of Health Maintenance
Organizations and the Defense of ERISA Preemption, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 855, 856-67 (1998)
(describing the HMO physician contractual arrangements in the various types of HMO models);
0. Mark Zamora, Medical Malpractice and Health Maintenance Organizations: Evolving
Theories and ERISAs Impact, 19 NOVA L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1995) (giving an overview of the
structure of lIMOs).
8.
In this context, "patient" refers to either an ERISA plan participant--"any employee or
former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization--or beneficiary--"a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee
benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit." ERISA § 3(7)-(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)(8) (1994).
9.
ERISA preemption provides for the displacement of state law for claims that "relate
to" an employee benefit plan. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Under ERISA, plaintiffs
are entitled to certain remedies allowed under the act. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
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"[N]ot a model of legislative drafting,"" the statute's broad
preemption clause provides that state law claims that "relate to" an
ERISA plan are preempted.12 The ambiguous phrase "relate to" has
been the primary focus of the Supreme Court's attempts to determine
the reach of the preemption clause.' 3 Relying primarily on a textual
interpretation of the statute, the Court has held that, while ERISA
does not preempt "run-of-the-mill state-law claims,"14 those plans that
have a "connection with or reference to"' 5 an ERISA plan, without
being a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection," s are preempted.
The Supreme Court's tortured attempts to give effect to the statutory
language have led to doctrinal confusion and "chaos" in the lower
courts.' 7 Little judicial guidance, therefore, currently exists for inter-

preting ERISA's poorly constructed preemption clause.
ERISA is implicated in medical malpractice claims through its
regulation of employee welfare plans. 18 An "employee welfare benefit
plan" under ERISA is a "plan, fund, or program" that an employer
establishes or maintains to provide medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits to participants through the purchase of insurance.' 9

(1994) ("A civil action may be brought, (1) by a participant or beneficiary... to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan .... "); see also infra Part H.B.3.
10. A woman whose breast cancer went undetected for lack of a mamnmogram, for
example, could only recover approximately $100, the cost of the mammogram, but would be
barred from actual damages. See infra Part H.B.3.
11. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
12. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also infra Part II.B.2.
13. See infra Part H.B.2.
14. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) (describing
such claims as "unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA plan"
as "run-of-the-mill state-law claims").
15. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,96-97 (1983).
16. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992)
(citation omitted).
17. Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Languageof ERISA Preemption? A Case
Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 60-82 (1996) (describing the failure
of the Supreme Court to establish a coherent doctrine, and the "chaos" in the lower federal
courts that has ensued).
18. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). ERISA regulates two categories of
employer-provided benefits plans: pension plans and employee welfare plans. See infra Parts
Hl.B.1 & IVA1.
19. ERISA §3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). An "employee welfare benefit plan7 is:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by an employer.., for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in
the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment ... or (B) any benefit
described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement or death, and
insurance to provide such pensions).
Id.; see also infra Parts H.B.1 & IV.
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Employer-provided health insurance, therefore, has been interpreted
as an employee benefit within the scope of ERISA. If a state cause of
action involving health care provided through an ERISA plan, such as
a medical malpractice claim, is deemed to "relate to" the employee
benefit plan, the cause of action is preempted by ERISA under section
0
514(a).2
Although most courts agree that direct liability actions against
MCOs21 are limited to remedies provided by ERISA, vicarious liability

claims against MCOs 22 have divided federal courts, 23 leading to calls
for legislative action.24 While the Supreme Court has not yet spoken
directly to the case of a medical malpractice claim against an MCO,
lower courts are increasingly adopting the reasoning put forth by the
Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc.25 The Dukes court held
that ERISA preempts claims interpreted as a denial of benefits, but
not those claims challenging the quality of care of benefits received. 26
Appealingly simple, this distinction may ultimately prove untenable;
often a reasonable argument can be made for an action based on
either a denial of benefit or substandard medical care.
The current jurisprudence of ERISA preemption contravenes
both of the congressional goals set forth for ERISA. First, the
interests of employees are not being protected. ERISA's broad
preemption clause has left many injured patients without meaningful
remedy. Second, the body of law for benefit plans is not uniform.
There are differences in the treatment of direct and vicarious liability
claims, employer-provided health care and non-employer-provided
health care, self-insured plans and commercial insurance, and hospi-

20. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
21. Direct liability claims are typically those claims involving MCO cost-containment systems or negligent hiring or supervision of physicians. For a discussion of theories of tort liability against HMOs, see Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 7, at 298-337; DiCicco, supra note 7, at
504-16; MacDougall, supra note 7, at 867-91; Zamora, supra note 7, at 1048-56. See also infra

Parts III.A.2 & Ill.B.1.
22. Vicarious claims are typically asserted against an MCO for the negligence of an
affiliated physician. See sources cited supra note 21; see also infra Parts HIA.2 & III.B.2.
23. See infraPart I.B.2.
24. See, e.g., Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.
1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1512 (1998) ("[W]hether or not Congress ever thought about the
impact on health care.., when it wrote ERISA[,] Congress is well equipped to revisit the issue
and alter the statutory language .... ."); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49,
60 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[Tlhe task of reforming ERISA... falls squarely upon the shoulders of
Congress."); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1993) ("If it sees fit, Congress can
clarify the scope of ERISA preemption so that litigation of the gray areas... may be avoided in
the future.").

25.

Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).

26.

Id. at 356-58.
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tals and MCOs.27 Despite calls for legislative action, Congress has
been unsuccessful in passing legislation amending ERISA to better
protect health care plan members.28
Courts have the power to interpret the statute to comply with
ERISA's goals of employee protection and uniformity. Thus far courts
have failed to accomplish these goals because they have interpreted
the preemption clause based on the assumption that the health plan
is the employee welfare benefit plan, and the health care received is
the ERISA benefit. The statutory language and structure, as well as
the congressional intent and available legislative history, suggest
another valid interpretation: ERISA regulates employer administrative plans that provide for employee health coverage, rather than the
health plan itself. The benefit that ERISA guarantees, therefore, is
the health plan membership, not the health care. By adopting such a
27. See infraParts fl.B.2, III.B.1, & m.B.2.
28. Congress introduced over 30 health care-related federal bills that addressed ERISA
preemption, managed care, health insurance, or provider-patient communications in 1997. See,
e.g., H.R. 135, S. 143, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing for a minimum hospital stay following
mastectomy or lymph node dissection); H.R. 328, S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of genetic information); H.R. 444, 105th Cong. (1997) (assuring
health coverage for workers over 55 years of age who leave employment); H.R. 616, S. 249,
105th Cong. (1997) (defining requirements for coverage surrounding mastectomies); H.R. 617, S.
727, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring annual screening mammography for women aged 40 and
over); H.R. 760, 105th Cong. (1997) (mandating coverage for screening mammograms and Pap
smears); H.R. 815, S. 356, 105th Cong. (1997) (assuring access to emergency medical services);
H.R. 1222, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring MCOs to meet certain consumer protection
requirements); H.R. 1515, 105th Cong. (1997) (establishing requirements for portability,
participation in insurance and access to coverage); H.R. 1525, 105th Cong. (1997) (establishing
requirements for prescription drug coverage); H.R. 1737, 105th Cong. (1997) (mandating a
specific level of access to OB/GYN services); H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997) (clarifying
accountability for violations with respect to managed care plans); H.R. 1854, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring offer of children-only coverage to dependents); H.R. 2152, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring coverage for annual screening mammograms); H.R. 2409, S. 1147, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring provision of nondiscriminatory coverage for substance abuse treatment); H.R. 2525,
S. 1208, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting restrictions on contraceptive drugs, services, and
devices); H.R. 2532, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring expanding access to health insurance
coverage with pre-existing conditions exclusions); H.R. 2693, S. 1536, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring coverage for bone mass measurements as appropriate); H.R. 2854, 105th Cong. (1997)
(requiring 48 hours health care after delivery following vaginal delivery and 96 hours following
cesarean section); H.R. 2967, 105th Cong. (1997) (establishing requirements for managed care);
S. 24, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing for access and choice in health care); S. 1307, 105th Cong.
(1997) (providing for coverage of benefits for retirees).
Some states have enacted legislation that specifically addresses the ERISA preemption
dilemma. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 354.400-.551 (1997), amended by H.R. 335, 89th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (amending state law governing MCOs so as to preclude
financial inducements, regulate utilization review procedures and review of adverse benefit
determinations, and to arguably open MCOs to liability by eliminating statutory section stating
MCOs "not ... deemed to be practicing medicine"); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§
88.001-88.003 (West 1999) (allowing plan members to appeal benefit determinations and
imposing liability on MCOs).
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statutory construction, ERISA would regulate membership in an employer-provided health plan, assure the "benefit or right" of health
plan membership, and preempt only claims for improper administration of the health plan or withdrawal or denial of membership. All
medical malpractice claims would be outside of ERISA's scope,
providing uniform treatment of direct and vicarious claims, employerprovided and non-employer-provided health care, self-insured and
commercial insurance plans, and hospitals and MCOs.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of ERISA, including
statutory text and structure, congressional intent, and legislative history. It explores the Supreme Court's attempts to define "employee
welfare benefit plan," its jurisprudence of ERISA preemption, from its
earlier broad interpretation to its arguably more narrow interpretation today, and its limit on remedies under ERISA. Part III provides
an overview of MCO structures and cost-containment measures, as
well as theories of MCO liability. It then explores the current division
among lower courts in deciding ERISA preemption of medical malpractice claims. Part IV develops an alternative interpretation of
ERISA's "employee welfare benefit plan" that views an ERISA plan as
the employer's administrative plan providing for employee health
coverage.
II. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974

A. The History and PurposeBehind ERISA
Congress enacted ERISA after employer mismanagement left
thousands of workers and retirees without their pensions. 29 Prior to

ERISA, these benefit plans had been subject to widespread abuse, 30
leaving employees responsible for policing their individual plans3' or
at risk of losing their benefits. 32 Prompted by this mismanagement
and the considerable growth in the "size, scope, and numbers of em29. See BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
1, 3 (4th ed. 1993). Although Senator Jacob Javits introduced the bill in 1967, ERISA was not
enacted until September 2, 1972, after years of debate. See id. Previous measures were apparently insufficient to regulate employee benefit plans. See id.; see also U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, Administration of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act:
ERISA. A Report to Congress in Fulfillment of Provisionsof Section 107 ofReorganizationPlan
No. 4 of 1978, at 6-7 (1980).
30.

See COLEMAN, supranote 29, at 1.

31.

See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639,4642.

32.

See COLEMAN, supranote 29, at 1, 3.
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ployee benefit plans,"33 Congress sought to protect employees by requiring plan disclosure, establishing standards of conduct, and providing employees access to the federal court system.3 4
ERISA attempted to provide a uniform body of employee
benefit law for vesting, funding, insurance, and portability standards.35 It proposed to eliminate conflicting or inconsistent state and
local regulation of employee benefit plans,6 and to establish exclusive
federal authority for such regulation3 7 ERISA also sought to provide
appropriate remedies for employees and access to federal courts for all
38
parties.
In sum, Congress intended both to protect employees from

administrative and funding abuses3 9 and to ensure uniformity of

benefit law. 40 These goals, however, are often in conflict. Congress
addressed its first goal by establishing standards for the administration of employee benefit plans and for the operations, termination,
and substance of pension plans. 41 Congress dealt with its second goal

by recognizing the potential for state interference with the proposed
law42 and inserting a broad provision that preempts state laws that
"relate to any employee benefit plan," the so-called preemption
clause. 43

33. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
34. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C. §1001(b)).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655.
36. See PilotLife Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 46.
37. See 120 CONG. REo. 29,197 (1974) ("[Tlhe crowning achievement of this legislation [is]
the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit
plans.").
38. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
39. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's PreemptionClause and the Health CareIndustry: An
Abdication of JudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355, 358 (1994) (stating that
ERISA was intended to "protect employees from administrative and funding abuses while establishing fair vesting requirements for pensions").
40. See sources cited supranotes 36-38.
41. See ERISA §§ 101-1017,29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1461 (1994).
42. For a discussion of federalism issues surrounding preemption, see generally Michael
K Carrier, Federal Preemptionof Common Law Tort Awards by the FederalFood, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 51 FOOD DRUG L.J. 509 (1996) (discussing the history of federal preemption and
its development surrounding "the protection of citizens' health, safety, and welfare"); Pittman,
supra note 39, at 380-84 (discussing the evolution of federal preemption jurisprudence related to
ERISA preemption).
43. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Congress excepted from preemption state
laws that regulate insurance ("savings clause"), ERISA § 514(bX2XA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA)
(stating that "nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance"), but specifically prohibited states from
deeming an employee benefit plan an insurer for purposes of the savings clause ("deemer
clause"), ERISA § 514(bX2XB), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XB) (stating that "an employee benefit
plan... shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company").
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B. The Languageand Structure of ERISA
The analysis of ERISA preemption of medical malpractice
claims typically involves the remedies clause under section 502 and
ERISA's preemption clause in section 514. Although not generally
evaluated in these claims, the definition of "employee welfare benefit
plan"" in section 3(1) is also crucial to the analysis. Only those claims
that "relate to an employee benefit plan" are preempted. Thus, an
employee benefit plan must exist for the preemption clause to be
implicated.
1. Defining "Employee Welfare Benefit Plan"
ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan 45 as "any
plan, fund, or program" that an employer establishes or maintains to
provide "medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits" to participants
through the purchase of insurance.4 The Eleventh Circuit converted
this definition into five requisite elements in Donovan v.
Dillingham:47 "(1) a 'plan, fund, or program' (2) established or
maintained (3) by an employer... (4) for the purpose of providing
medical, surgical, [or] hospital care [or]... benefits... (5) to
participants or their beneficiaries."4 In developing these criteria, the
court stated that a "'plan, fund, or program'... implies the existence
of intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source of financing, and
a procedure to apply for and collect benefits," and that "established
and maintained" does not require "a formal, written plan."49 In its
definition, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit included an administrative
component--procedure to apply for and collect benefits"--in the
definition of employee welfare benefit plan.

44. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
45. While most ERISA preemption cases have focused on whether a state law claim
"relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan, some cases have centered on whether the benefit program in question was an employee benefit plan. See, e.g., Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d
352, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We have devised a comprehensive test for determining whether a
particular plan qualifies as an 'employee welfare benefit plan'; we ask whether a plan: (1)
exists; (2) falls within the safe-harbor provision established by the Department of Labor; and (3)
satisfies the primary elements of an ERISA 'employee benefits plan'-establishment or
maintenance by an employer intending to benefit employees."); Peckham v. Gem State Mut.,
964 F.2d 1043, 1045 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the threshold question was "whether the
benefit program at issue (was] an 'employee welfare benefit plan' under" ERISA).
46. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); see also supra text accompanying note 19.
47. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
48. Id. at 1371.
49. Id. at 1372.
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The Supreme Court addressed the contours of the "plan" definition in FortHalifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.5° At issue was a Maine
statute requiring a one-time severance payment to employees in the
event of a plant closing.51 The Court held that the statute did not
establish or require the employer to maintain an employee welfare
benefit plan and was not preempted. 52 In finding the statute not
preempted, the Court undertook a thorough analysis of ERISA's
"employee benefit plan."53 It reasoned that ERISA focuses "on the
administrative integrity of benefit plans, which presumes that some
type of administrative activity is taking place."Further
emphasizing the administrative aspect of ERISA plans, the Court
stated that "[o]nly a plan embodies a set of administrative practices
vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork
scheme of regulation."65 Clearly, the Court contemplated an employee
benefit plan encompassing administrative components. This administrative component was the object of Congress's concern over
uniformity; that is, Congress intended the administrationof employee
benefit plans to be uniform.
The Court later explicitly ruled on the issue of whether an
employer fund was a "plan" within the meaning of ERISA in
Massachusetts v. Morash.56 Massachusetts had enacted a law requir57
ing employers to pay employees for unused vacation time.
Acknowledging that an employer fund to provide vacation benefits
"undoubtedly falls within the scope of [ERISA]," the Court held that
the "policy here to pay employees for unused vacation time [did not]
constitute[ ] an employee welfare benefit plan."58 The Court reasoned
that the benefits regulated by ERISA "accumulate over a period of
time and are payable only upon the occurrence of a contingency
outside of the control of the employee." 59 The Court also realized that
including this procedure in the definition of "plan" would force
employers to comply with extensive reporting and disclosure
requirements-at the risk of employers discontinuing the
practice-and "would vastly expand the jurisdiction of the federal
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
See id. at 3-4.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 11-12.
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
See id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
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courts. " 60

The Court pointed to the states' traditional regulation of
payment of wages (including vacation pay) as further support for its
holding.61
The Morash Court's description of covered benefits as those
that accumulate over a period of time is supported by ERISA's reference to the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA7).62

ERISA

defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan established by
employers through the purchase of insurance to provide medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits and any benefit described in
section 302(c) of the LMRA.63 The LMRA in relevant part refers to
situations in which payments are held in trust to pay "for the benefit
of employees.., for medical or hospital care." 64 This statute,
therefore, refers to situations where the employer holds funds to subsequently provide for the employees' benefit. Thus, the LMRA
supports Morash's definition of an ERISA benefit as one accumulating
for distribution, and the definition of an ERISA plan as employer
administration for the benefit of employees.
In sum, Morash, Fort Halifax, and ERISA's reference to the
LMRA all suggest that the employee benefit plans regulated by
ERISA include administrative practices, and that the benefits protected "accumulate over a period of time." In other words, ERISA
regulates employer administration of accumulated benefits. Given
this parameter, a health plan could not be considered an ERISA plan
because a health plan does not incorporate employer administration,
nor does health coverage accumulate for subsequent distribution.
Specifically, in the context of health plans, employers provide the
administrative and financial support for employee health plans;
MCOs, on the other hand, either provide the health care directly or
indirectly by administering the employee health plan.65

The

employer's role, therefore, is to provide administrative support for the,

60. Id. at 118-19.
61. See id. at 119.
62. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1994), is commonly
referred to as the Tai-Hartley Act.
63. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). See supra note 19 for full statutory text.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5XA) (1994).
65. In order to escape the regulatory burdens of state law and state taxes applicable to
health insurers, most large employers have self-insured their employees' health benefits
utilizing third-party administrators ("TPAs") or insurance companies providing administrative
services only ("ASO"). See CLARK C. HAviGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLicY:
READINGS, NOTES, AND QUESTIoNS 67 (2d ed. 1998). Self-insured plans, representing
"approximately 70% of the roughly 160 million Americans covered by employer-sponsored health
plans," i&, typically "employ[ I an insurer or HMO to administer the plan under an [ASO]
contract," id. at 219.
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employee health plan, not to administer the health plan itself. The
ERISA plan, and its requisite administrative component, must be the
employer's administrative infrastructure providing for the employee
health plan, rather than the health plan itself.
2. Section 514: ERISA Preemption
Provided for in section 514(a), ERISA preemption 66 is a federal

defense to state law claims, originally intended to promote uniformity
in the federal regulation of benefit law.67 This preemption provision
provides for the replacement of state law by ERISA when a state law
claim "relate[s] to any employee benefit plan."68
The analysis of whether ERISA preempts medical malpractice
claims against MCOs is limited to ERISA section 514(a),69 and does
not reach 7° the savings clause in section 514(b)(2)(A) 71 or the deemer
clause in section 514(b)(2)(B). 72 The dispositive analysis is whether a
73
cause of action "relate[s] to any employee benefit plan."

66. This term is also known as substantive, conflict, or federal preemption. ERISA preemption is distinguishable from complete preemption, a jurisdictional doctrine providing for removal jurisdiction for otherwise non-federal claims when the federal defense of preemption is
asserted. The complete preemption doctrine was first recognized in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, Intl Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561 (1968), and applies when the force of the
federal statutory preemption is sufficiently powerful so as to displace a state cause of action
addressed by the federal statute. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1987) (stating that "Congress may so completely preempt a particular area that any civil
complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character"). Complete
preemption in ERISA can be understood as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule,
allowing removal to federal courts when the federal defense of ERISA preemption is raised in
actions detailed in ERISA section 502(aX1XB)--to recover benefits, or enforce or clarify rights.
See generally Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process
Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927 (1996) (discussing complete preemption); see also
Robert A. Cohen, Note, UnderstandingPreemptionRemoval Under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 578 (discussing the process of "preemption removal"). Because removal jurisdiction is
based on ERISA preemption as a federal defense, the analyses of complete preemption and
ERISA preemption often become intertwined. Several cases have attempted to clarify the
complete preemption/ERISA preemption distinction. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care
Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1487-88 (7th Cir. 1996); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639-42 (7th Cir.
1995); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 1995).
67. See supraPart H.A.
68. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
MCOs are not engaged in the business of insurance for the purposes of applying ERISA's preemption provision, making the savings (Q 514(bX2XA)) and deemer clauses (Q 514(bX2XB)) irrelevant to the ERISA preemption analysis of state law claims against MCOs).
71. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 43.
73. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). There has been limited litigation over the
definition of "plan" as applied to ERISA's preemption clause. Instead, the vast majority of
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The development of the current preemption clause in section
514 is difficult to describe. 4 The original ERISA bill contained a limited preemption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to
specific subjects covered by ERISA.75 The House bill would have preempted only those state laws that "relate to" funding and benefits
vesting provisions of pension plans and those that "relate to the
fiduciary
and
responsibilities
disclosure
and
reporting
responsibilities."76 The Senate bill would instead have preempted

77
state laws that "relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act."

Congress, however, hoped to eliminate controversy over interpretation
by making the language broad and simple.7 8 The Conference
Committee abandoned these attempts in favor of the statute's current
79
broad "relate to" language with little explanation.
Despite Congress's hope that the broad language would eliminate controversy, lower courts struggle to decide whether ERISA
preempts direct and vicarious liability claims. The Supreme Court,
although silent on the issue of ERISA preemption of medical
malpractice claims, has made attempts to clarify the broad language
of ERISA's preemption clause.
Early Supreme Court decisions asserted an expansive interpretation of ERISA's ambiguous "relate to" language, leaving a wide
variety of state claims within ERISA's reach. The Court initially defined "relate to" as a "connection with or reference to" an ERISA
plan,8 0 offering little guidance for applying this standard. The Court
has, however, applied this standard to hold preempted state statutes
82
such as anti-discrimination laws, 8 ' an anti-garnishment act, an antimedical malpractice claims against MCOs have hinged on an evaluation of whether the cause of
action "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan under section 514(a). See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 147,
151, 163-71.

74. See, e.g., Jay Conison, ERISA and the Languageof Preemption,72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619,
646-48 (1994) (discussing the inability to understand the development of ERISA's preemption
clause based on legislative history).
75. See id. at 646-47.
76. 120 CoNG. REc. 4742 (1974).
77. Id. at. 5002.
78. See id. at 29,942.
79. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 125 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 5038,
5162; see also Conison, supra note 74, at 646-47; Fisk, supra note 17, at 53 (noting that the
change appears to have been related to a desire to prohibit prepaid legal services plans).
80. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (holding two New York laws
forbidding employee benefit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy preempted by ERISA insofar as they pertained to ERISA plans).
81. See id. at 88. The Human Rights Law prohibited discrimination in employment, including employee benefits, on the basis of pregnancy. The State's Disability Benefits Law required employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work due to pregnancy. See
id. at 88-90.
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subrogation statute, 4 and a statute requiring equity in workers' compensation benefits,84 as well as actions such as a wrongful discharge
claim85 and improper processing of claims for benefits. 86 These cases
resulted in the preemption of claims that had only an indirect effect
on ERISA plans and those "not specifically designed to affect [ERISA]
plans."87 The breadth of the Court's interpretation raised the question
of the extent of ERISA's preemptive reach.
The Court attempted to limit the "connection with or reference
to" standard by holding that claims with a "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" connection with the plan were not preempted.8 As with the
"connection with or reference to" standard, however, the Court has
provided little guidance for determining the claims that fall under
this exception.8 9 Despite this attempt to limit the reach of "relate to"
language, it was not until New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurancethat the Court arguably restricted
its interpretation of the "relate to" language.90
The New York statute at issue in Travelers Insurance in effect
charged different hospital rates for commercial insurance plan and
MCO participants than it did for Blue Cross & Blue Shield participants. 1 Recognizing the limited usefulness of the statutory text, the
Court looked to the statutory intent to determine the scope of pre82.

See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)

(holding a Georgia statute proscribing garnishment of employee benefits preempted because the
statute applied exclusively to ERISA plans).
83. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (holding that a Pennsylvania

statute prohibiting employee benefit plans from subrogating a claimant's tort recovery following
injury "related to" ERISA plans and was, therefore, preempted).
84. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1992)

(holding a District of Columbia statute requiring employers who provide employee health
insurance to also provide comparable worker's compensation benefits preempted because it re-

ferred to ERISA plans as a baseline).
85.

See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (holding respondent's

claim preempted because it was predicated on his subscription to an employee benefit plan).
86. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 60, 62-63 (1987) (refining Pilot
Life's holding by stating that not only are such claims preempted by ERISA, but they are "also
displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement provision"); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
57 (1987) (holding state law causes of action for improper processing of benefit claims
preempted).
87. Ingersoll-RandCo., 498 U.S. at 139.
88. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
89. See, e.g., GreaterWash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130 n.1 (cautioning that many laws

of general applicability have such a relationship but giving no further indication of how to best
determine "tenuousness").
90. New York Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S.
645, 649 (1995) (holding a New York hospital rate-setting statute that subjected commercial
insurance and MCO participants-but not Blue Cross & Blue Shield plan participants-to a
surcharge was not preempted).
91.

Id.
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emption.9 2 Ultimately, however, a unanimous Court decided the case
based on ERISA's "unhelpful text," once again applying the
"connection with or reference to" standard. 93 Specifically addressing
the economic effect of the New York statute, the Court stated that the
differential rates would only indirectly affect what an ERISA plan
could afford, and that the mere indirect economic effect did not satisfy
the "relate to" threshold.9 In so holding, the Court arguably raised
95
the threshold for ERISA preemption.
Although based on ERISA's statutory text, Travelers Insurance
included a discussion of preemption in general. The Court stated that
there is a presumption against federal preemption of a "state action in
fields of traditional state regulation. " 96 Discussing the field of
regulation at issue, the Court stated that "nothing in the language of
[ERISA] or in the context of its passage indicates that Congress chose
to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been
a matter of local concern." 97 Further exploring the issue of preemption and field of regulation, the Court found that, because "quality
control" efforts were deemed to only indirectly affect ERISA plans, 98
they were not subject to ERISA preemption. 99
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence does not lead to
clearly articulable principles, several relevant themes do exist. State
laws that directly regulate the employer-employee relationship0 and
those that relate to the administration of employer-provided benefit

92.

See id. at 656 ("We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating

difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a
guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.").
93. Id.
94. See id. at 661 (citing the "tenuousness" exception from preemption in Greater
Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130 n.1). The Court did not, however, state that an
indirect economic effect can never trigger preemption.

95.

Subsequent cases have confirmed Travelers Insurance's narrower interpretation of

"relate to." See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997)
(holding that ERISA's preemption clause did not reach a New York gross receipts tax on ERISA-

funded medical centers); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
519 U.S. 316, 319 (1997) (holding that a California wage law did not "relate to" ERISA plans and

was not preempted).
96.
97.

TravelersIns., 514 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted).
Id. at 661.

98.
99.

Id.
This finding raises questions as to whether medical malpractice claims could be char-

acterized as "quality control" efforts, thereby avoiding ERISA preemption.

100. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,58 (1990) (holding anti-subrogation state
law preempted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983) (holding state laws
prohibiting employer discrimination preempted).
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planslol are preempted. In contrast, state laws that regulate the substance of employee welfare benefit plans are not preempted.102
Considering these themes, the Court's interpretation of ERISA preemption arguably contemplates federal regulation of the administrative aspects of employer-provided benefit plans, but not the substance
of these plans. This, then, supports the proposition that ERISA
regulates employer administration, which precludes an interpretation
of a health plan as the ERISA plan.
3. Section 502: Remedies Under ERISA
Congress set forth the remedies allowed under ERISA in section 502.10s Section 502(a)(1) allows plan participants to bring civil
actions to recover benefits due, enforce rights under the plan, or
clarify rights to future benefits.0 4 Participants may also seek "other
appropriate equitable relief under section 502(a)(3)(B). 10 5
The Supreme Court has held that the civil enforcement remedies enumerated in section 502 are the exclusive remedies available
under ERISA.1°6 Interpreting the statutory enforcement scheme as
"strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies," 0 7 the Court has denied the award of extra-contractual
damages °8 under section 502(a)(3). 109 The Court reasoned that allow-

101. See, eg., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 60, 62-63 (1987) (state
causes of action for improper processing of claims preempted); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (same).
102. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114 (1989) (state law requiring
payment for unused vacation time not preempted); Fort Halifax Packing Co., v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1987) (state law requiring a one-time severance payment not preempted).
103. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994).
104. ERISA § 502(aX1XB), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX1XB); see also supra notes 6, 9-10 and
accompanying text.
105. ERISA § 502(aX3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX3). "A civil action may be brought... (3) by a
participant... (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief.. . ." Id. at § 1132(a)(1), (3).
106. See Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 52 n.3, 54. The Court reached this decision despite
prior cases in which it had allowed recovery of damages because it was "difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by
illegal conduct." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (allowing punitive
damages for claims resulting from a plutonium escape from a federally licensed nuclear facility).
107. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985) (holding that
a cause of action for extra-contractual damages under ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1994) (breach of fiduciary duty), could not be asserted by a plan beneficiary under ERISA §
502(aX2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), because damages are not available).
108. Extra-contractual damages include damages outside of a benefit plan, such as
compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages. See Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 846 F.2d 821, 824 (1st Cir. 1988).
109. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993) (holding that
"equitable relief' under section 502(aX3XB) precludes awarding damages).
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ing various state law remedies to supplement ERISA's civil enforcement remedies would undermine ERISA's goal of uniform regulation
of benefit plans.11 The rights and benefits delineated in a benefit
plan are thus the only remedies available for civil actions under
section 502.
Federal courts have also consistently held that punitive damages are not recoverable as "other appropriate equitable relief under
section 502(a)(3)."' Because plan participants and beneficiaries are
limited to the rights and benefits due under a benefit plan,8 medical
malpractice claims preempted by ERISA offer no extra-contractual
damages.
Several courts have noted that, while ERISA was intended to
protect the interests of employees, it has often denied these workers
an adequate remedy."8 Plaintiffs with medical malpractice claims
have often been limited to plan benefits even when damages were
justified.114 While courts have lamented the injustice and called for
congressional action," 5 they have often followed precedent and denied

110. See PilotLife Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 54.
111. See, e.g., Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 635 (3rd Cir. 1989); Drinkwater,846 F.2d
at 824; Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 888 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988);
Bishop v. Osborn Transp., Inc., 838 F.2d 1173, 1173-74 (11th Cir. 1988); Varhola v. Doe, 820
F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987); Kleinhans v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627
(7th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters.,
Inc. 793 F.2d 1456, 1462-65 (5th Cir. 1986); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability
Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 780
F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985); Dependahlv. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216-17 (8th
Cir. 1981). But see Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 905, 914 (Ala. 1995)
(affirming a lower court holding that state law claims were preempted by ERISA but reversing
its holding that ERISA denies punitive or extra-contractual damages).
112. See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX1)(B) (1994).
113. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1995) ("One
consequence of ERISA preemption.., is that plan beneficiaries... bringing certain types of
state actions... may be left without a meaningful remedy"); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 984 F. Supp., 49, 59 (D. Mass. 1997) ("ln the managed care context, the wrongful denial of
benefits by an insurer... can lead to damages far beyond the out-of-pocket cost of the treatment
at issue .... [I]f a beneficiary never receives treatment because of the insurers failure to preapprove, ERISA leaves him without any meaningful remedy."). But see Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe lack of an ERISA remedy does not
affect a pre-emption [sic] analysis."); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable, HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272,
1276 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Nor is it relevant to an analysis of the scope of federal preemption that
appellants may be left without remedy.").
114. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338 ("The result ERISA compels us to reach means
that the [plaintiffs] have no remedy, state or federal, for what may have been a serious mistake."). Other courts have taken the lack of remedy into account in determining ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("We, too, do not
believe that Congress can have intended, prior even to invention of the cost containment system
[of MCOsI, to foreclose recovery to plan beneficiaries injured by negligent medical decisions.").
115. See, e.g., cases cited supranotes 113-14.
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damages to deserving plaintiffs, leaving some injured employees
without a remedy.116

III. ERISA PREEMPTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
A

Liability in the World of Managed Care

1. Managed Care Organizations: Structure and Cost-Containment
The traditional health care delivery system has utilized a "feefor-service" payment system. Under fee-for-service, the health care
provider offers services to the patient and receives payment for these
services from a third-party payor, the patient's insurer. Because the
patient is effectively insulated from the cost of the services and the
provider receives payment only for providing services, there is arguably an incentive for greater provision of health care services-more
services and more costly services. 17
As health care costs have risen, traditional fee-for-service has
given way to a system of managed care." 8 In contrast to the tradi-

116. See, e.g., Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1276 (disregarding the fact that "appellants [were] left
without remedy"); see also Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 60 ("This Court can neither simply
disregard its sworn oath to comply with the opinions of the Supreme Court, nor can it 'legislate
by judicial decree nor apply a statute, such as ERISA, other than as drafted by Congress.'
(quoting Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 419,424 (D. Mass. 1997)).
117. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein,
Coping with Quality/CostTrade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role ofPSROs, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 6,
15-20 (1975).
118. From 1993 to 1997, the enrollment ofAmerican workers in MCO plans rose from 52%
to 85%. See Ron Winslow, Health-CareInflation Kept in Check Last Year, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20,
1998, at B1.
Enacted in the days of traditional fee-for-service insurance, ERISA has never been amended
by Congress to keep pace with the transition to managed care. Recent federal legislation has attempted to address this apparent lag. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (attempting to limit exclusion from insurance
plans based on pre-existing conditions); Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996,
29 U.S.C. § 1185 (1996) (establishing standard benefits for mothers and newborns); Mental
Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996) (ensuring parity in the
application oflimits to mental health benefits).
States have also attempted to address concerns over managed care. In the first six months
of 1997, nearly 1,000 bills addressing various managed care issues were introduced across the
states. See Milt Freudenheim, Pioneering State for Managed Care Considers Change, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1997, at Al. For a discussion of earlier state attempts, see Milt Freudenheim,
H.M.O.'s Cope with a Backlash on Cost Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, at Al (stating that
34 states had enacted laws that limit manage care in the preceding 18 months), and Leigh Page,
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tional fee-for-service payment system that separates health care
providers and third-party payors, managed care integrates health
care financing and delivery through contracts with physicians and
hospitals to provide "comprehensive health care services to enrolled
members for a predetermined... premium."119 MCOs, functioning as
payors, are financially at risk for the health care costs of their enrollees. To decrease this financial risk, MCOs typically use capitation
payment methods-a fixed monthly per-capita payment-and employ
a variety of cost-containment measures, such as utilization review,
pre-authorization requirements, the use of primary care provider
"gatekeepers," limitations in choice of providers, and provider financial incentives.120 With the pre-set capitated payment system to cover
all provided services, there are arguably incentives to provide fewer
and/or less costly services in managed care.' 2 '
To fully recognize the impact and functioning of cost-containment measures-as well as potential exposure to liability-it is important to understand the structure of MCOs. The most familiar of
the MCOs is the Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"), "an
organized system of health care which provides or arranges for a
comprehensive array of basic and supplemental health care services." m
The HMO contracts both with health care providers to
provide health care services to its enrollee patients, and with enrollees to pre-pay per-capita premiums. Through these contractual relationships, the HMO "both insures for the cost and provides for the
State Legislators Spent Busy Year Trying to Manage Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 9,
1996, at 3 (stating that 35 states had enacted laws involving managed care).
For a general discussion of the emergence of and issues related to managed care, see Daniel
N. Burton & Micheal S. Popok, Managed Care 101, FLA. B.J. Apr. 1998, at 26. See also James
F. Henry, Comment, Liability of Managed Care OrganizationsAfter Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare:
An Elemental Analysis, 27 CuMB. L. REv. 681, 685-88 (1996-97) (describing the current
structure of the managed care industry); Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians
in Managed Care, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443, 444-50 (1997) (describing the changing role of

physicians with the advent of managed care).
119. John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1167, 1167-70 (1994). The American Medical Association defines

managed care as: "[hecontrol of access to and limitation on physician and patient utilization
of services by public or private payers or their agents through the use of prior and concurrent
review for approval of or referral to service or site of service, and financial incentives or penalites." J.K Iglehart, HealthPolicy Report: The American Health CareSystem, 326 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 962, 965 (1992).

120.

For a discussion of methods by which MCOs manage costs, see Ila S. Rothschild et al,

Recent Developments in Managed Care, 32 ToRT & INS. L.J. 463, 463-68 (1997).
121. For a discussion.of the cost-containment aspects of managed care, see MacDougall,
supra note 7, at 891-96. See also Pittman, supra note 39, at 361-62 (1994) (describing cost-containment in managed care); Rothschild et al., supra note 120, at 463-68 (1997) (discussing meth-

ods for cost-containment in managed care)
122. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1230 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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delivery of health care services" to its enrollees:n the health care
provider provides services to the patient and the HMO pays the
health care provider a negotiated capitated payment.
There are several types of HMOs in operation: the Staff Model
HMO, the Group Model HMO, the Network Model HMO, and the
Individual Practice Associations ("IPAs"). The structure of the HMO
dictates the relationship of the HMO to the physician, and is,
therefore, often determinative in the imposition of liability. The Staff
Model HMO employs its own physicians and owns the medical facility. m Because the physicians are HMO staff, an employer-employee
relationship exists and the HMO is susceptible to a respondeat
superior claim for physician malpractice. A Group Model HMO
contracts with a group of physicians-rather than individual
physicians-to provide care to its enrollees. 12 There is no employeremployee relationship with the group model, and the medical group
often provides services to private fee-for-service patients in addition
to their HMO enrollees. Network Model HMOs are similar to group
models, but instead contract with several medical groups to provide
services rather than with one group. 2 6 Like the group model, network
model physicians are compensated with capitated payments for their
HMO enrollees, but retain the ability to provide services to private
fee-for-service patients. In an IPA Model HMO, the HMO contracts
with an IPA, a legal entity consisting of a partnership or corporation
of physicians.127 The IPA, in turn, contracts with its independent
physicians to provide services to plan enrollees.m While the IPA is
paid a capitated rate by the HMO, the individual physicians are paid
129
on a fee-for-service basis.
Other types of MCOs include the Preferred Provider
Organization ("PPO") and Point of Service ("POS") plans. A PPO is a
"health care delivery model in which physicians, hospitals, and/or
other providers of health care contract to administer their services on
123. Bearden & Maedgen, supranote 7, at 289.
124. For a full description of the Staff Model HMO, see Bearden & Maegden, supra note 7,
at 292; L. Frank Coan, Jr. Note, You Can't Get There From Here-Questioningthe Erosion of
ERISA Preemption in Medical MalpracticeActions Against lMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023, 1028
(1996); DiCicco, supra note 7, at 503-04; MacDougall, supranote 7, at 865.
125. For a full description of the Group Model HMO, see Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 7,
at 292-93; Coan, supra note 124, at 1028-29; DiCicco, supra note 7, at 504-05; MacDougall, supra note 7, at 865-66.
126. For a full description of the Network Model HMO, see DiCicco, supra note 7, at 505;
MacDougall, supranote 7, at 866.
127. See Coan, supra note 124, at 1029.
128. See id.
129. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 7, at 293.
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a predetermined fee-for-service basis to a defined group of patients." 30
Like traditional fee-for-service plans, enrollees pay a premium to the
PPO, which then reimburses the health care providers for services
provided, 13' typically at a reduced rate. 32 PPO physicians are
independent contractors who may maintain their own private practice
and may also participate in more than one PPO.133

Similar to the

PPO, the POS plan has greater emphasis on controlling costs, offering
greater coverage for enrollees who stay within the plan for services
than for those who seek care outside of the plan.' 34
Although the various types of MCOs differ in structure, they
all have a similar focus on controlling costs. In addition to limiting
costs through capitated payment systems, MCOs utilize various costcontainment methods to reduce health care costs. A common practice
in controlling costs is utilization review ("UR)-a determination of
whether a service is medically necessary and appropriate. 3 5 By refusing payment for services not deemed medically necessary, the HMO
acts as "rationer" of medical services, effectively reducing health care
costs.

36

While UR is generally "based on 'established clinical crite-

ria'.., to evaluate the quality and appropriateness of medical care," 137
there is concern about the intrusion of a third-party payor into a
provider's medical decision making-a concern only somewhat alleviated by potential MCO liability for negligent refusal of medically necessary services. Pre-authorization (or pre-certification) functions in a
similar manner to UR. MCOs often require prospective authorization
be obtained prior to the provision of services, particularly for costly
services. 3 8 Such authorization processes are common requirements
for hospital admissions and emergency room care. By refusing
130. John Lewis Smith III & Lawrence L. Lamade, Preferred ProviderPlans Break New
Legal Ground,LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 21, 1983, at 27.
131. See Catherine Butler, Preferred Provider Organization Liability for Physician
Malpractice, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (1985).
132. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 7, at 297; Rothschild et al., supra note 120, at

464.133. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 7, at 298.
134. See Rothschild et al., supranote 120, at 465.
135. See Pittman, supra note 39, at 362. For a discussion of the types of UR, see Burton &
Popok, supra note 118, at 30.
136. See Pittman, supranote 39, at 363.
137. David D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical
TreatmentDecisions,25 GA. L. REV. 861, 883-85 (1991).
138. See Burton & Popok, supra note 118, at 30 (describing prospective certification);

Rothschild et al., supra note 120, at 464 (describing health plan requirement for approval prior
to rendering services). For cases involving pre-authorization, see Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance
Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving withdrawal of authorization of surgery) and Kuhl
v. Lincoln National Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving delay in pre-

certification for surgery).
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payment for services not deemed medically necessary, the MCO can
maintain greater control over health care costs. Again, attempting to
reduce services not deemed medically necessary, MCOs often employ
primary care provider "gatekeepers." These health care providers
serve to minimize the inappropriate use of specialists by evaluating
the appropriateness of a patient's referral. 139 Provider financial
incentives are often coupled with the use of "gatekeepers." MCOs
often offer providers financial incentives to restrict services to those
deemed absolutely necessary. 40
These MCO cost-containment measures arguably compromise
provider autonomy and medical decision making-as well as quality
of care.' 4 ' There is, therefore, an argument that MCOs should be held
liable for the results of these cost-containment measures and the
actions of affiliated physicians working under the cost-conscious
42
guidelines imposed by MCOs.
2. Theories of Managed Care Liability
Injured patients often seek tort recovery from MCOs for their
actions and for the actions of affiliated physicians. Claims based on
direct actions of MCOs are direct liability claims, and those based on
the actions of an affiliated physician are vicarious liability claims.
Hospital liability for corporate negligence-imposing a duty on
hospitals to supervise staff physicians and monitor quality of patient

139. See Rothschild et al., supra note 120, at 464-65. For cases involving UR, see Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995) (involving UR organization's failure to
authorize hospitalization) and Corcoranv. UnitedHealthcare,Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)

(involving UR organization's denial of hospitalization).
140. For a case involving a physician's failure to disclose a financial incentive program, see
Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997) (involving

physician's financial incentive to minimize referrals).
141. See, e.g., Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 407-11 (1996) (raising concern that physician incentive

payments may result in a lower standard of care); John E. Ware, Jr. et al., Differences in 4-Year
Health Outcomes for Elderly and Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-forService Systems: Results From the Medical Outcomes Study, 276 JAMA 1039, 1042 (1996)

(describing health outcomes for specific patient groups as worse among HMOs than among feefor-service plans). But see Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work
in Progress, 276 JAMA 1083, 1085 (1996) (stating that there is "no objective evidence of any
overall decline in the quality of care in the new system").
142. Many scholars suggest the imposition of liability on specific parties serves to improve
quality. See, e.g., GuIno CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCiDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970) (suggesting targeting those parties in the best position to control quality
and assigning them liability).
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care-is a relatively recent occurrence. 143 The justifications for
imposing corporate liability on hospitals include the public perception
of hospitals as responsible for the care provided, their unique position
in monitoring physicians, and the creation of incentives for hospitals
to insure staff competency. 144 MCOs, like hospitals, provide health
care coverage, select health care providers, and are capable of
monitoring the quality of care. MCOs are, therefore, potentially
susceptible to direct liability claims. 145 These claims include negligent
supervision or selection of health care providers, utilization review
practices, and cost-containment measures. 46
But, despite the
similarities between the functioning of MCOs and hospitals, ERISA
preemption serves to immunize the MCOs from direct liability claims.
Vicarious claims against MCOs for the negligence of physicians
are based on either a respondeat superior or ostensible (apparent)
agency theory. 47 Under the theory of respondeat superior, the MCO
employer is liable for the negligence of the employee physician.148
Respondeat superior, therefore, is only applicable in the case of Staff
Model HMOs. The theory of ostensible, or apparent, agency involves
situations in which a principal MCO represents or creates the
appearance that the independent contractor physician is an agent, a
third-party patient reasonably relies on the representation or
appearance, and the physician's negligence results in harm. 149 Claims
under ostensible agency, therefore, can occur in any type of MCO
utilizing independent contractor physicians. Courts are currently
divided on the issue of whether ERISA preempts vicarious liability
claims.
B. Courts InterpretERISA Preemption
Because the Supreme Court has never specifically spoken to
the issue of medical malpractice and ERISA preemption, federal
143. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem'1 Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1.
1965) (rejecting the traditional view that hospitals do not undertake to treat patients and
imposing a duty on hospitals to supervise physicians and monitor quality of care).
144. See BARRY R. FURROw ET AL., HEALTH LAw 467-70 (1995). Some scholars advance the

role of enterprise liability and nondelegable duty in medical malpractice liability of MCOs. See,
e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health PlansAccountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L.
REv. 587, 615-18 (1997).
145. See MacDougall, supranote 7, at 880.
146. See id. at 881-96.
147. See, e.g., Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1231-35 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1988) (extending ostensible agency theory to the MCO context and delineating criteria with
which to determine the relationship).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
149. See id. § 267.
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courts have struggled to interpret and appropriately apply seemingly
inconsistent Supreme Court precedent in the context of medical
The Supreme Court's lack of clarity in ERISA
malpractice.
preemption cases and its historically broad interpretation of the
preemption provision has provided little guidance for the lower courts.
Apart from the medical malpractice realm, federal courts have
attempted to establish guidelines to assist in interpreting and
applying the ERISA preemption provision. 150 Within the context of
medical malpractice, however, there have been few guidelines
regarding ERISA preemption.
1. ERISA Preempts Direct Liability Claims
Most courts have agreed that ERISA preempts causes of action
against MCOs that relate directly to the administration of claims or
benefits under an ERISA plan. 151 The courts have preempted such
claims based on a statutory interpretation assuming that the ERISA
plan is the health insurance plan, with the "benefit" under the plan
being the health care itself. In holding such claims preempted, courts
have focused on the role of MCOs and UR providers as "arrangers" of
delivery of care-rather than as health care providers themselves-as
well as the real need for MCOs to make certain decisions regarding
health plan administration.
In Corcoran v. United Healthcare,Inc., the Fifth Circuit held
that a wrongful death action against a UR organization was
preempted by ERISA. 15 2 In analyzing the malpractice claim for the
death of plaintiffs' unborn child following denial of authorization for
hospitalization, the court wrestled with the question of whether the
UR organization made medical decisions or benefit determinations.'6
The court ultimately found that UR organizations make medical
decisions "in the context of making a determination about the
150. See, e.g., Arkansas BC & BS v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 947 F.2d 1341, 1244-45 (8th Cir.
1991); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 555-58 (6th Cir. 1987); Sommers
Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F,2d 1456, 1467
(5th Cir. 1986).
151. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1995)
(preempting claim against UR organization for failure to authorize hospitalization); Spain v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (preempting claim for withdrawal of
authorization of surgery); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 301-04 (8th Cir.
1993) (preempting claim for delay in pre-certification for surgery); Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329-34 (5th Cir. 1992) (preempting claim against UR organization for denial of hospitalization).
152. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1338.
153. See id. at 1329-30.
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availability of benefits."M The court, therefore, viewed the health
care as the ERISA benefit and the UR organization as simply
determining available benefits under ERISA section 502. Since the
claim involved the administration of plan benefits, it was preempted
by ERISK
The Sixth Circuit followed the Corcoran decision in Tolton v.
American Biodyne, Inc. 5 The Tolton court held that the failure to
hospitalize a psychiatric patient who later committed suicide involved
utilization review, which "is a means of processing claims." 56 ERISA,
therefore, preempted the claim. Because the activities of UR
organizations clearly "[fell] within the scope of § 502(a)"--which
157
determines availability of benefits-such claims were preempted.
As in Corcoran, the Tolton court considered claims against UR
organizations to be claims based on the administration of benefit
plans, and, therefore, preempted by ERISA.
The Eighth Circuit in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,
Inc. had "no difficulty in concluding that the... state law
claims... [were] preempted by ERISA."158 The court held that ERISA
preempted a plaintiff's medical malpractice claim for a delay in precertification for heart surgery that ultimately led to the patient's
death. 59 In arriving at its holding, the court relied on its
interpretation that ERISA preempts those claims dealing with the
60
administration of benefits.
The Ninth Circuit followed the other circuits in Spain v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co. when it held that a wrongful death claim against a
UR organization for withdrawal of authorization for surgery involved
a "benefit determination[ ]."161

ERISA, therefore, preempted the

claim.162

2. Courts Split over Whether ERISA Preempts
Vicarious Liability Claims
While there has been some consensus about ERISA preemption
of direct liability claims, federal district courts disagree on whether
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 1331.
Tolton, 48 F.3d at 937.
Id. at 942.
Id.
Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
See id. at 303.
See id.
Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993).
See id.
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ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims against MCOs. 163 Those
courts holding that ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims emphasize the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the preemption provision. 1 These courts reason that a malpractice claim based
on the quality of care is actually a claim for denial of benefits. 165 Some
courts have also suggested that these claims are preempted because
the ERISA plan is the source of the parties' relationship. 66 Other
courts look to the level of inquiry required in deciding these
claims-for instance, reviewing the terms of the benefit plan-to
67
determine whether a claim "relate[s] to" the plan.
Courts holding against preemption look to the congressional
intent of uniformity in regulating ERISA plans.168 These courts recognize the Supreme Court's expansive preemption interpretation, but
hold that vicarious liability cases are not equivalent to actions to
collect benefits. 69 The courts state that the level of judicial inquiry
into the benefit plans to decide the claim does not sufficiently "relate
to" ERISA plans so as to trigger preemption. 70 Instead, these courts
look to the physician-patient interaction and evaluate it based on pro-

163. So much confusion exists that some districts have case law on both sides of the preemption issue. Compare Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 826 (D. Md. 1995) (holding that
a vicarious liability claim was not preempted by ERISA), with Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med.
Servs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 110, 116 (D. Md. 1994) (preempting a vicarious liability claim).
164. See, e.g., Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 128 (D.N.J. 1994) (looking to the Supreme
Court's expansive reading of ERISA's preemption clause in preempting a vicarious claim).
165. See, e.g., Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61, 63-64 (D. Conn. 1990)
(holding a vicarious liability claim preempted because it arose from the delivery of health benefits).
166. See, e.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding a vicarious liability claim preempted because the relationship between the provider and
patient was based on the terms ofthe benefit plan).
167. See, e.g., Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 116 (holding that a vicarious liability claim was
preempted because it involved an examination of the MCO's representations); Ricci v.
Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (D.N.J. 1993) (preempting a claim because the contract
defined the relationship between the provider and the patient and ultimately affected the circumstances of the medical treatment).
168. See, e.g., Roseman, 878 F. Supp. at 826 (holding that a reference to an ERISA plan in
order to prove ostensible agency does not implicate the policy concerns of ERISA).
169. See, e.g., Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544, 547-49 (S.D. IlM. 1994)
(holding that the alleged substandard care was unrelated to plan administration and was not
preempted); Smith v. HMO Great Lakes, 852 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (N.D. IMI.1994) (stating that
the vicarious liability claim was not a claim for denial of benefits, but rather rested on the
MCO's contractual relationship with affiliated physicians and was not preempted).
170. See, e.g., Pacificare, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 159 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
reference to the ERISA plan for purposes of establishing the agency relationship did not compel
preemption); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
that ERISA was not implicated by reference to the plan as evidence that the MCO held a
provider out as an agent).
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fessional standards of conduct, an area of law traditionally reserved
for states. 171
Among federal courts, there is also a question about the
Supreme Court's arguably evolving interpretation of ERISA's preemption provision: the expansive reading of Pilot Life and Shaw, or
the more narrowly defined interpretation of Travelers Insurance.
Some courts have apparently taken no judicial notice of Travelers
Insurance,172 while others have embraced this higher threshold for
73
preemption.
Several cases decided after Travelers Insurance relied entirely
upon Supreme Court decisions prior to Travelers Insurance. In Jass
v. PrudentialHealth Care Plan, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that
vicarious liability claims directly "related to" a benefit plan because
the agency relationship existed as a result of the ERISA plan.74 The
Court relied on Supreme Court decisions pre-dating. Travelers
InsuranceY5 A Texas district court also looked to earlier Supreme
Court cases to define its ERISA preemption standard in Blum v.
Harris Methodist Health Plan.76 The court held that the plaintiffs'
claims did "not directly affect the relationship between the principle
entities" and were therefore preempted by ERISA 7 A Kansas district court also apparently disregarded Travelers Insurance and
"followed the Supreme Court in reading the preemption clause
broadly" in Clark v. Humana Kansas City, Inc.178
Other courts have followed Travelers Insurance, finding its
more narrow interpretation of ERISA's preemption provision

171. See, e.g., Elsesser v. Hospital of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.
Supp. 1286, 1290-92 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that professional malpractice actions are
traditionally reserved for state law and are not preempted in the absence of congressional
intent). There is also a line of cases holding that professional malpractice is traditionally a state
law claim. See Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1467 (4th Cir. 1996) (insurance);
Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165-67 (4th Cir. 1996) (legal); Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp.,
Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1996) (medical negligence claims); Painters Dist. Council No. 21
Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1152-53 (3rd Cir. 1989) (state professional
malpractice actions).
172. See, e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1486-95 (7th Cir.
1996); Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-0374-P, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19732, at *4-*13 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997); Clark v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 975 F. Supp.
1283, 1286-89 (D. Kan. 1997).
173. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1148-50
(E.D. Va. 1997); Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp. 304,310-12 (D. Md. 1995).
174. Jass, 88 F.3d at 1482.
175. See id-at 1486-88.
176. Blum, 1997 U.S. Dist. LFXIS 19732, at *4-'12.
177. See id at *10.
178. Clark v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (D. Kan. 1997).
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"particularly instructive." 1 9 A Maryland district court reviewed the
Supreme Court precedent in Chaghervand v. CareFirst and stated
that Travelers Insurance had recently clarified the scope of ERISA
preemption. 1' Looking to the decision's language regarding the presumption against federal preemption in areas of traditionally local
concern and its attempt to comply with the underlying statutory objective, the district court held that the vicarious liability claim against
the MCO was not preempted by ERISA.181 Similarly referring to
Travelers Insurance, a Virginia district court relied on the decision's
narrowing interpretation of the scope of ERISA preemption in
Lancaster v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan.182 The court held that
the plaintiffs vicarious liability claims were not preempted because
the federal defense of ERISA preemption did not preempt professional
1
malpractice actions-an area of traditional state regulation. 8
3. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare's"Denial of Benefits
Versus Quality of Care"
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.'8 consolidated two federal
district court cases alleging medical malpractice. 185 The Third Circuit
reversed the district court's holding that removal jurisdiction existed
because the state law claims fell within section 502(a)(1)(B).186 In the
lower court Dukes case, the plaintiff filed suit against the MCO
claiming that the death of her husband was due to the hospital's
refusal to perform a blood test.187 In Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, the
companion case to Dukes at the appellate level, the plaintiffs brought
a negligence claim against the MCO following the birth of their
stillborn daughter, claiming the obstetrician had failed to recognize
signs of preeclampsia. 1'
The lower courts found the medical malpractice claims
preempted. In so holding, the lower courts in both cases mixed the
179. Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 n.38 (E.D. Va.
1997).
180. Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F. Supp. 304,310 (D. Md. 1995).
181. See id. at 312.
182. Lancaster,958 F. Supp at 1148 n.38.
183. See id, at 1149.
184. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
185. Id. at 351; see also Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097 (ED. Pa. 1994),
rev'd, Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350; Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa.
1994), rev'd, Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350.
186. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361.
187. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 40.
188. Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1099.
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analysis of complete preemption-a jurisdictional doctrine providing
the basis for removal jurisdiction189 -with that of ERISA preemption.
A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, complete preemption
in this context provides for federal jurisdiction of state-law medical
malpractice claims where the federal defense of ERISA preemption is
asserted. 19° The lower courts ultimately held that federal jurisdiction
existed and that removal had been proper.' 9' Because claims that are
completely preempted92 are, by definition, preempted by ERISA, the
cases were dismissed.
The Third Circuit reversed the consolidated cases, holding that
the state claims were improperly removed because the claims were
not completely preempted.93 The cases were remanded to state court
for ERISA preemption determination.'9 In its attempt to clarify the
complete preemption analysis, the court ultimately defined the
reasoning for ERISA preemption claims for both direct and vicarious
liability claims.
The court relied strongly on congressional intent in its
analysis. The court reasoned that Congress intended to assure plan
benefits in section 502, but did not attempt to control the quality of
benefits received-an area traditionally reserved for state
regulation. 95 The seminal distinction for complete preemption,
therefore, was whether the claim was "about the quality of benefits
received" or an attempt to enforce rights under a plan.'9
Recognizing that "the distinction between the quantity of
benefits due under a welfare plan and the quality of those benefits
will not always be clear," the court admitted that there may be situations where the quality of care is so low as to "not qualify as health
care at all." 97 The court did not, however, offer any guidance in deciding whether a claim is a denial of a benefit or a claim about quality of
care.
Because the analyses of complete preemption and ERISA preemption are so intertwined, subsequent courts have relied on the di189. See sources cited supra note 66.
190. See supra note 66.
191. See Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1105.
192. Complete preemption in this context means the claim falls under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B). See supra note 66 for further explanation.
193. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995).
194. See id. Note, however, that this-and similar decisions-leaves the determination of
the federal issue of ERISA preemption to state courts.
195. See id. (finding that removal was improper when based solely on an attack of the
quality of the benefits received).
196. Id. at 356-57.
197. Id. at 358.
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chotomy set forth in Dukes to evaluate ERISA preemption. 198 These
courts have attempted to effectively differentiate claims as either a
denial of a benefit or a claim for quality of care. 19 Many medical
malpractice claims when re-phrased can be considered a claim
concerning the quality of care or a denial of benefit. For example, the
case of a failure to provide a mammogram can be either negligence or
a denial of benefit. For this reason, the Dukes distinction between a
denial of benefit or a claim for quality of care fails to provide a
workable solution.
IV. ASSERTING A NEW STATUTORY INTRPRETATION

A. Redefining an ERISA Plan
The current interpretation of ERISA as regulating health
plans and providing for the benefit of health care contravenes the
statutory goals of protecting employee interests and establishing uniformity in benefits law. Patients are often left without meaningful
remedy for medical malpractice claims against MCOs, and courts
remain split on ERISA preemption--direct liability claims are treated
differently than vicarious liability claims, and employer-provided
health care is treated differently than non-employer-provided health
care. 00 An interpretation of ERISA as regulating employer administration of health plans and guaranteeing the "benefit" of health plan
membership-rather than health care-would serve to effectuate
ERISA's goals of employee protection and uniformity of benefit law.
Such an interpretation is supported by statutory language and construction, congressional intent, legislative history, and ERISA preemption jurisprudence.

198. See, e.g., Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Or. 1997);

Dykema v. King 959 F. Supp. 736, 740-41 (D.S.C. 1997); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 114445 (E.D. Va. 1997); Hoyt v. Edge, No. 97-3631, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *4-*7 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1997); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343,
349-50 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Muller v. Maron, No. Civ-A. 94-5052, 1995 WL 605483, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 13, 1995); Frappier v. Wishnov, 678 So. 2d 884, 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
199. See, e.g., Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1146 (asserting that physician's decision not to
obtain an MRI was a medical determination rather than a decision to deny benefits); Roessert,
929 F. Supp. at 350-51 (finding action for medical malpractice related to the quality of benefits
received, and, therefore, was a medical rather than an administrative decision).
200. Also, self-insured plans are treated differently than commercial insurance and MCOs
are treated differently than hospitals.
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1. Statutory Language and Structure
ERISA's statutory language and structure suggest that the
"plan" regulated by ERISA cannot be the health care plan itself.
ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, fund,
or program... established or maintained by an employer.., for the
purpose of providing for its participants ... through the purchase of
insurance... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or
benefits in the event of sickness."21 Restated, an ERISA plan is a
plan that an employer establishes by purchasing insurance to provide
medical care or benefits to participants. An ERISA plan, therefore, is
one that an employer-not an MCO-establishes or maintains to
provide for employee health care. As such, the statutory language
clearly contemplates the regulation of an employer's role of providing
for health care through insurance, rather than the regulation of the
provision of health care. Specifically, the statute implies, and the
caselaw interpreting a "plan" indicates, 2 2 that ERISA regulates
employer administrative operations-or "plans"-that provide for
health care rather than regulating the health care itself. ERISA,
therefore, preempts only those claims that "relate to" employer
administrative plans that provide for employee health care: claims
for improper administration of a health plan and claims of withdrawal
or denial of health plan membership.
The statutory construction of ERISA also supports this
interpretation. ERISA regulates both pension plans and employee
welfare plans in various sections of the statute. Specifically, ERISA
regulates the administration of both pension and employee welfare
(1) reporting and disclosure rules; (2) fiduciary
benefit plans:
obligations; and (3) preemption. 20 3 However, ERISA only regulates
the "content" of pension plans-it does not cover the content of
employee welfare benefit plans. 2°4 This statutory construction clearly
implies that Congress intended to regulate only the administration of
employee welfare benefit plans, not the content of those plans. Any

201. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
202. See supra Part II.B.1.
203. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA.. OfPolicies and "Plans,"72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 559, 567-71, 586-96 (1994).
204. See id. at 577-86. There are few exceptions to this assertion. Congress amended
ERISA in substantive part in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1994)) (including continuation of
coverage requirements for employer-provided health plans); and Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1181
(1996)) (restricting limitations for pre-existing conditions).
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interpretation of ERISA that provides for the regulation of anything
but the administration of an ERISA plan would, therefore, be antithetical to the intent of the statute. Therefore, ERISA cannot
preempt medical malpractice claims, since such claims deal with the
content (the health care provided) rather than the conduct (the
administration) of the plan. It is, instead, more consistent with
ERISA's construction to view ERISA as regulating plan membership,
leaving traditional tort law to regulate the health care provided.
2. Congressional Intent
Congress intended to promote uniformity when it enacted
ERISA.20
As ERISA is currently interpreted, this goal is not
realized.2 Courts are split on ERISA preemption: direct liability is
treated differently than vicarious liability; employer-provided health
care is treated differently than non-employer-provided health care;
self-insured plans are treated differently than commercial insurance;
and MCO providers are treated differently than hospitals.
Interpreting an ERISA plan as the employer's administrative
infrastructure providing for health care would promote uniformity.
Such an interpretation would provide for uniformity in the
administration of plans-that is, uniformity in the offering of health
care plan membership. All claims of withdrawal of plan membership
would be preempted, coming under federal rather than state law.
A second goal in enacting ERISA was to protect employee
interests.207 Because the current interpretation allows preemption of
medical malpractice claims, injured patients are denied adequate
remedy. Employee interests, therefore, are best served by allowing
these claims to be brought in state court where extra-contractual
damages could be granted. In other words, employee interests in the
context of medical malpractice claims are best served when these
claims are not preempted. By interpreting ERISA as regulating the
employer's administrative infrastructure providing for health care,
rather than the health care plan itself, courts could avoid preemption
of medical malpractice claims.
Congress enacted ERISA in response to pervasive employer
administrative and funding abuses. 208 The purpose was, therefore, to

205. See supra text accompanying notes 4,35.
206. See supratext accompanying note 27; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 3, 34,39 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Pittman, supra note 39, at 357-59.
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regulate employer actions to protect employees. Because the ERISA
plan is currently interpreted to be the health care plan, ERISA
regulates the health care provider-the provider of the "benefit" of
health care-rather than the employer as intended. If, instead, an
ERISA plan were interpreted to be the employer's administrative plan
that provides for health coverage, ERISA would appropriately
regulate the employer in protection of employees. Clearly, this
interpretation is more consistent with the purpose of the statute.
3. Legislative History
The employer abuses that led to ERISA's enactment resulted
in thousands of workers and retirees losing their pensions.N These
events were unrelated to health care, and there is no indication that
Congress intended to regulate health care plans or medical
malpractice claims, deny patients legal recourse for negligent medical
care, or to effectively deny an appropriate forum for medical malpractice claims traditionally regulated at the state level.210 The current
interpretation implicates ERISA in the regulation of health care in
ways clearly not anticipated at its inception.
ERISA is now used to immunize MCOs from medical malpractice claims. At the time of ERISA's enactment (1974), managed care
essentially did not exist. There is no-and could be no-indication
that Congress sought to regulate managed care, much less immuni.e
MCOs. Such a reading has no support in the historical context in
which ERISA was enacted.
4. ERISA Plan Jurisprudence
The interpretation of ERISA argued for in this Note would be
consistent with Supreme Court and lower court jurisprudence. In
considering the benefit protected by ERISA, the Supreme Court has
stated that a benefit "accumulate[s] over a period of time and [is]
payable only upon the occurrence of a contingency outside of the
control of the employee."211 There is obvious difficulty in reconciling
such a description with a benefit of health care: health care is

209. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
211. Massachsetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989).
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provided to employees as warranted upon request, and does not
accumulate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that an
ERISA plan includes an "ongoing administrative program" and a "set
of administrative practices."212
The employer's role is to
administratively and financially provide for employee health plans,
not to administer the health plan. The MCO-which either directly or
indirectly provides the health care-administers the health plan.
Because an ERISA plan is provided by the employer and includes
"administrative practices," the ERISA plan cannot be the health
plan-a plan in which the employer has no adminstrative role. The
ERISA plan must, instead, be the employer's administrative scheme
3
providing for the health plan membership.'

212. Fort Halifax v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1987). Lower courts have also contemplated
the inclusion of an "ongoing administrative program" in ERISA plans. See, e.g.,
Peckham v.
Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043, 1048 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[We agree that such an ongoing
administrative program is required under FortHalifax... "); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d
1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that the definition of an ERISA plan "implies the existence
of intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source of financing, and a procedure to apply for
and collect benefits"); Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614
(S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that a "health care plan' cannot constitute an ERISA plan because a
'managed care entity... does not include an employer purchasing coverage.'" (quoting TEX
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001(8) (West 1999))).
In analyzing whether an employee benefit plan is a "plan" for purposes of ERISA, courts
have looked at the employer's involvement with the administration of the plan, see Gahn v.
Allstate Life Ins. Co., 926 F.2d 1449, 1452 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that to make a determination
of whether a plan is an employee welfare benefit plan, the lower "court should have focused on
the employer... and his involvement with the administration of the plan"); whether the
employer administered the policy or its benefits, see Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health Benefits
Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that ERISA does not regulate the'
purchase of health insurance if "the purchasing employer neither directly nor indirectly owns,
controls, administers or assumes responsibility for the policy or its benefits"); and whether there
was an intention by the employer to provide benefits, see Wickman v. Northwestern Natl Ins.
Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the "crucial factor in determining if a 'plan'
has been established is whether the purchase of the insurance policy constituted an expressed
intention by the employer to provide benefits on a regular and long term basis").
213. The leading case for deciding ERISA preemption cases is instructive on this point. See
supra Part IH.B.3. The Dukes court's distinction between a claim for denial of benefit versus
quality of care-a distinction which under the current statutory interpretation is
unworkable-could provide the basis for analysis under the statutory interpretation suggested
by this Note. If the benefit guaranteed by ERISA is health plan membership-not the health
plan-then a claim based on the denial of membership is covered by the ERISA preemption
clause. A claim regarding the quality of the health care received or provided-that is, a medical
malpractice claim-would not be preempted.
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B. The Implications of a New Statutory Interpretation
Clearly, it is Congress's role to clarify and revise ERISA.214
But this is not to say that the judiciary cannot participate in
clarifying ERISA preemption and vindicating employee rights. If
courts were to interpret the ERISA "plan" as the employer
administrative infrastructure providing for employee health coverage,
medical malpractice claims would not be preempted. Specifically,
neither direct liability claims nor vicarious liability claims against
MCOs for medical malpractice would be preempted. Injured patients
would have access to state law and adequate remedies. If MCOs were
liable for direct and vicarious liability claims, the jurisprudence
surrounding hospital liability for physician negligence would be
instructive. 215
If the judiciary were to embark on this path, ERISA would instead preempt only those claims of denial of health plan membership.
Both of ERISA's goals would be realized:
employees would be
protected and the "benefits law" surrounding plan administration
would be uniform.

V. CONCLUSION
ERISA as currently interpreted contravenes both statutory
goals of uniformity and employee protection. Injured patients' medical malpractice claims against MCOs are left without meaningful
redress and courts have failed to provide consistency in regulating
liability claims.
The current judicial interpretation of ERISA
preemption must change to effectuate these goals. If ERISA is interpreted as regulating the employer administration of benefit plans,
214. See supra note 24. Congress has introduced several bills amending ERISA. (a) bills
that make section 514 inapplicable to state causes of action (Managed Care Bill of Rights for
Consumers Act of 1997 H.R. 2606, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997); Patient Access to Responsible Care
Act of 1997 (PARCA), S. 644, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997)); Responsibility in Managed
Care Act of 1997, H.R. 2960, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Employee Health Insurance Accountability
Act of 1997, S. 1136, 105th Cong. (1997)); (b) bills that amend section 502 to allow for federal
remedy under ERISA for "failure to provide benefits" (Managed Care Plan Accountability Act of
1997, H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997)); (c) bills that establish a review process for denial of
benefits (Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, H.R. 820, 105th Cong. (1997)); (d)
bills that impose liability on MCOs for withholding medically necessary care (Comprehensive
Managed Health Care Reform Act of 1997 (EIR. 2905, 105th Cong. § 3(f) (1997); and (e) bills that
set forth managed care requirements and standards for utilization review (Managed Care Bill of
Rights for Consumers Act of 1997, H.R. 2606, 105th Cong. (1997), and Health Insurance Bill of
Rights of 1997, S. 373, H.R. 820, 105th Cong. (1997)).

215. See supra Part mIA2.
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ERISA would protect the benefit of membership in a health plan,
rather than the health care itself. Such an interpretation is
supported by the statutory text and structure, as well as the statute's
purpose and history. This interpretation promotes uniformity in employer administration of benefit plans by allowing both direct and vicarious liability claims against MCOs, and protects employee interests by allowing damages following injury.
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